
Referenced Statements

Start Lester 1991

1. In both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, where rates of homicide and other indictable crimes increased over the period 1950 to 1990, rates of suicide increased as well, suggesting that both causes of death could be considered indicators of a more general societal disorder. 1
2. A 1992 paper used Identity Salience Theory to argue that “Whether they are Catholic or Protestant, people in Northern Ireland use the symbols of religious affiliation to form a major public identity”, and that “symbols of religious affiliation based on stable structural forces [sustain] the conflict” [p. 220]. From this theory they hypothesised firstly that levels of religious orthodoxy in Northern Ireland can be expected to be high, and secondly to be largely independent of other demographic attributes; they found strong empirical support of the first hypothesis, and fairly strong but more mixed evidence for the second hypothesis, with indications that religious orthodoxy reduces with education, employment and income.2
3. Both important parallels and difference between the religious sectarianism of Northern Ireland and racism have been noted, with both race and religious identity operating as visible social markers, and the colonial heritage of the island of Ireland leading to a concentration of industrial development, wealth and economic opportunity within Protestant regions in the North East of the island.3
4. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the main police force in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), was drawn disproportionately from Protestant rather than Catholic populations, with evidence that Catholics working in the RUC faced cultural detachment from the broader Catholic community.4
5. Much of the resource from terrorist groups in Northern Ireland was drawn from the black economy, including activities such as fraud, extortion and racketeering.5
6. Additional terrorist legislation was developed throughout the Troubles to try to make it easier for those involved in terrorism to be prosecuted.6
7. Psychologists have long been interested in the conflict in Northern Ireland, investigating both the mental health impacts of the conflict on individuals, and the role of group identity and dynamics in sustaining conflict.7
8. Theories of conflict management include both resolution-based approaches, emphasising the development of shared understanding and relations between groups, and settlement-based approaches, emphasising negotiation and bargaining for resource between groups, though such approaches are not mutually exclusive.8
9. Paramilitary ceasefires in late 1994 were identified near the time as important developments in the peace process, and the best hope for resolution of the conflict for over twenty five years.9
10. An international survey on religious and political outlook in people in eight countries in the early 199s, including Northern Ireland, found evidence that non-religious people also tend to have less faith in political institutions.10
11. Not all religious people in Northern Ireland are Protestant or Catholic, and such ‘religious independents’ have been shown to have views on a wide range of social and political issues that are different from Protestants and Catholics.11
12. Paramilitary operations by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) officially ended on 31 August 1994; six weeks later, on 13 October 1994, a cessation of violence was announced by Loyalist forces, leading to a situation described in 1995 as a ‘cold peace’.12
13. At least one individual who served in armed forced in Northern Ireland during the Troubles has experienced post-traumatic stress disorder from a terrorist attack he did not experience directly, but believed he did.13
14. The Catholic share of Northern Ireland’s population has been steadily rising throughout the 1970s and 1980s.12
15. A studiously collected record of deaths due to the conflict, published in 1994, suggests that in most years Republicans were responsible for more killings than any other military or paramilitary faction, peaking at over 250 deaths in 1972, before levelling off to around 50 killings per year throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Loyalist killings rose to over 100 in the mid 1970s, before falling to around 10 killings per year in the 1980s, then rising again in the early 1990s.14
16. As religion became less of a defensive social identity, so there may have been more willingness amongst Catholics to address injustices committed within the Catholic church, such as the sexual abuse of children.15
17. Loyalist terrorism has been labelled ‘pro-state’ terrorism, in which perpetrators act believing they are carrying out the state’s duties in eliminating security threats.16 The boundary between such forms of terrorism and vigilantism is thus porous.
18. A resumption of IRA violence occurred on 9 February 1996, marked by the bombing of Canary Wharf in London.17
19. A review of completed suicides over one year in Northern Ireland found the majority (86%) had previously presented with clinical syndromes, and that males who completed suicide tended to have longer periods of contact with health care professionals than females.18
20. Suicide rates in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland tended to be less than half those in England & Wales and Scotland in the 1960s, more than doubling during the 1970s and 1980s, but not to levels greatly above those in England & Wales, and remaining somewhat below those in Scotland.19
21. Interviews with 117 14-15 year olds in Northern Ireland showed attitudes to the inevitability of conflict fell sharply after the 1994 ceasefire announcements.20
22. It has been argued that the role of the IRA in tit-for-tat sectarianism is overstated, and that instead they should be considered a guerrilla army engaged in a strategic military campaign.21
23. The role of the RUC as the sole agents of social control and managing crime was contested in many parts of Northern Ireland, leading to the growth of informal or ‘popular’ forms of crime management and social control instead; it has been argued that political violence from groups engaged in such activities may have had a positive effect on crime management.22
24. Analysis of attitudes of over 200 students in Northern Ireland in the late 1990s found national and religious identities not to be salient in how students saw themselves.23
25. Practice and attitudes within either Northern Irish Protestantism and Catholicism are not monolithic, and so differences within either group can be overstated.24
26. Sporting activity may be one means by which separate Protestant and Catholic identities can be sublimated under a shared ‘Northern Irish’ identity.25
27. Conflict and contestation over space is not confined in Northern Ireland to urban areas, and is also observed in rural communities and vilalges.26
28. Concerns about physical or professional reprisals to unwelcome reporting may have led journalists based in or covering Northern Ireland to be selective in what they report about the conflict. 27
29. Using the term ‘paramilitary’ to refer to the IRA may underplay the close links between the organisation’s military and civil activites.28
30. A total of 3598 deaths were attributed killings in the conflict between 1969 and 1998. A breakdown of these deaths by age group indicates one quarter of these deaths occurred in people aged 18-23, with attributed killings then falling with age.29 Unlike many conventional wars, however, children aged 12-17 also died in large numbers.29
31. It has been argued that, whereas ethno-national conflict since the establishment of Northern Ireland in 1921 sharpened the border with the Republic of Ireland, the European Single Market made it more permeable, highlighting the influence that global factors can have on the region.30
32. It may be that Northern Ireland has not been analysed as rigorously as a case study of conflict as other civil wars in perhaps less affluent regions.31
33. Catholics in Northern Ireland had disadvantaged class positions relative to Protestants for much of the period 1922 to 1972, but these inequalities had sharply reduced by 1996. 32
34. There are complex relationships between national and religious identity, with Polish national identity long considered synonymous with Catholic religious identity, for example, while in Northern Ireland a Catholic religious identity is more likely to confer a pan-Irish rather than Northern Irish national identity.33 Catholicism may therefore operate more as a distinct and different ‘cultural religion’ linked to different secular identities in Northern Ireland than Poland,33 and so any headline statistics comparing the Catholic population of Northern Ireland over time may need to consider Northern Irish Catholics and other European Catholics as distinct populations with different implications for further conflict in Northern Ireland.
35. The apparent stability of peace in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement has allowed for a greater focus on economic regeneration in Belfast.34
36. In the conflict in Northern Ireland, the distinction between ‘combatants’ and ‘non-combatants’ was often fuzzy, meaning incidental or intentional targeting of non-combatants by either side may have been commonplace.35
37. In Northern Ireland Catholic and Protestant religious identities are so entwined with broader cultural and political identities that no long-term solution to political problems can neglect the issue of religion.36
38. The Provisional IRA has been considered in depth a case study in power, in the various ways terrorist groups must develop and manage multiple forms of power and authority – including physical power, resource power, position power – to resource and sustain a campaign of violence for many decades, and in the tactics and considerations given to these issues within the Green Book, a key IRA training manual.37
39. The European Commission invested over £80 million into district partnerships in Northern Ireland, through its Peace and Reconciliation Special Support Programme by the end of 1999.38
40. Qualitative research investigating the opinions of key stakeholders on both sides of the sectarian divide in Northern Ireland pointed out that simply investing large amounts of money into the region through the Peace and Reconciliation Special Support Programme does not necessarily lead to a reduction in sectarian conflict; indeed attempts to access such new resource could create a new opportunity for the escalation rather than the diffusion of such conflicts.39
41. It has been argued that British policy towards Northern Ireland did not change substantially from 1972, even with large changes in the head of government and the dominant party in Westminster. 40
42. The relative influence of key individual leaders in the face of long-standing communal animosity and other structural factors, and the interactions between local actors and international actors in the conflict, has been considered in some detail. 41
43. Loyal Order Protestant parades in Northern Ireland have been used as a case study in how one group’s shared identities, world-views, contested claims and grievances towards another group can be repeated and reinforced through collective displays termed ‘psychocultural dramas.’42
44. Direct experience of terrorist incidents can have lasting psychological effects, including PTSD.43
45. It has been argued that there were enough exceptional factors behind the Good Friday Arrangement that it is unlikely to be an effective and transferrable blueprint for constitutional conflict resolution elsewhere; amongst other factors listed was the fact that demographic change had meant that Protestants had become only a small rather than overwhelming majority of the population. 44
46. Analysis of deaths through civil unrest and suicide in Northern Ireland between 1965 and 1997 concluded that the two causes were negative correlated over the period.45
47. Social psychologists have constructed a multi-factor model of Northern Irish social identity, and found Catholics expressed greater stability and identification with their group identity than did Protestants. 46
48. Sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland has implications for effective communication in the workplace, creating the need for employers to adopt effective communication strategies to appropriately address an additional layer of contentious issues.47
49. The distinction between (intergroup) ‘bridging’ and (intragroup) ‘bonding’ forms of social capital proposed by Robert Putnam has been considered in the context of Northern Ireland, and the argument made that sectarian conflict may have increased ‘bonding’ capital within either group at the expense of ‘bridging’ capital between the groups. 48
50. Developing friendships with members of the other group in Northern Ireland has been shown to reduce anxiety about encounters with outgroup members and prejudice towards them, in both samples of university students and the general population. 49
51. Ethno-religious conflict in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel/Palestine were long considered similar in their apparent intractability, but have been considered resolved in South Africa and at least largely stabilised in Northern Ireland.50
52. Mutual recognition and respect for the two cultures in Northern Ireland has been a focus of the Northern Irish Community Relations Council.51



[SESSION 01: END O’LEARY 1995; WORDS 672]

[SESSION 02: End Breen 2000; Words 1289]

[SESSION 03: End Niens 2005; words 2068]